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Abstract: Santiago Ramón y Cajal, the primary architect of the neuron doctrine and the law of
dynamic polarization, is considered to be the founder of modern neuroscience. At the same time,
many philosophers, historians, and neuroscientists agree that modern neuroscience embodies a
mechanistic perspective on the explanation of the nervous system. In this paper, I review the extant
mechanistic interpretation of Cajal’s contribution to modern neuroscience. Then, I argue that the
extant mechanistic interpretation fails to capture the explanatory import of Cajal’s law of dynamic
polarization. My claim is that the definitive formulation of Cajal’s law of dynamic polarization,
despite its mechanistic inaccuracies, embodies a non-mechanistic pattern of reasoning (i.e., design
explanation) that is an integral component of modern neuroscience.
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1. Introduction
The Spanish microanatomist and Nobel laureate Santiago Ramón y Cajal (1852–1934), the primary
architect of the neuron doctrine and the law of dynamic polarization, is considered to be the founder
of modern neuroscience [1,2]. According to the neuron doctrine, the nerve cell is the anatomical,
physiological, and developmental unit of the nervous system [3,4]. To a first approximation, the law
of dynamic polarization states that nerve impulses are exactly polarized in the neuron; in functional
terms, the dendrites and the cell body work as a reception device, the axon works as a conduction
device, and the terminal arborizations of the axon work as an application device. The two papers in
which Cajal presented this law, namely, “Significación fisiológica de las expansiones protoplasmáticas
y nerviosas de las células de la sustancia gris” [5], and “Leyes de la morfología y dinamismo de
las células nerviosas” [6], must be seen as milestones in the historical development of functional
neuroscience [7,8]. When taken collectively, Cajal’s contributions to modern biological knowledge are
comparable to those of Vesalius, Harvey, Schwann, and Darwin.
At the same time, many philosophers, historians, and neuroscientists agree that modern
neuroscience embodies a mechanistic perspective on the explanation of the nervous system [9–11].
In modern, mechanistic neuroscience, scientific explanations must describe mechanisms, span several
levels, and integrate multiple fields [10]. To correctly describe a mechanism, a scientific model must
first identify the phenomenon the mechanism is responsible for [12]. The mechanistic phenomenon
is, in general, a combination of a target system and some behavior in which the target system
is involved [13]. Second, the model must represent the composing entities, the activities, and
the organizational properties of the target system that constitute the mechanism underlying the
phenomenon of interest [14,15]. The composing entities, and the activities those entities are involved
in, typically span several levels of organization in nature, from the atomic and the molecular to
the higher levels of complex brain networks and whole organisms. For this reason, the search for
mechanisms and their components requires the integration of experimental methods, empirical results,
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and conceptual resources from different scientific fields: for example, molecular and cellular biology,
neurophysiology, computational neuroscience, experimental psychology, and the cognitive sciences.
Paradigmatic exemplars of mechanistic explanation are the explanation of the action potential [10,16],
and the explanation of neurotransmitter release [17,18].
Mechanistic philosophers rarely introduce the scientific work of Cajal as a case study of modern
(mechanistic) neuroscience. Churchland [19] (p. 29) holds that Cajal was “mechanistic,” as opposed
to “vitalistic,” in that he had thought that electrical induction (instead of “mystical forces and
substances”) could explain all communication between neurons. However, the nineteenth-century
sense of “mechanism” is only vaguely related to the new mechanistic philosophy [20]. 1. Malanowski
and Craver [22] review Cajal’s [3] pioneering judgment that dendritic spines are real entities and not
artifacts of the Golgi’s staining technique. According to them, Cajal’s result prompted a transparently
teleological question: “why do neurons have spines?” that contributed to the search for neural
mechanisms. To my knowledge, Stinson and Sullivan [23] provide the most complete and revealing
study of Cajal’s work from the new mechanistic perspective. They suggest that Cajal’s law of
dynamic polarization delivers, at best, a how-possible model of the mechanism of nerve impulse,
or a re-description of the dynamic polarization phenomenon, at worst. In this paper, I review the
extant mechanistic interpretation of Cajal’s contribution to modern neuroscience. Then, I argue
that the extant mechanistic interpretation fails to capture the explanatory import of Cajal’s law of
dynamic polarization. My claim is not that Cajal’s mechanistic conjecture was true or even partially
true. In fact, most synapses involve communication by neurotransmitters rather than direct electrical
induction. My claim is that the definitive formulation of Cajal’s law of dynamic polarization, despite
its mechanistic inaccuracies, embodies a non-mechanistic pattern of reasoning (i.e., design explanation)
that is an integral component of modern neuroscience. While mechanistic explanations account
for how an explanandum phenomenon is brought about by identifying the parts, activities, and
organization of the underlying mechanism, design explanations account for why the target system
exhibit some morphological features by identifying the functional utility or the survival value of those
features. Thus, Cajal’s law of dynamic polarization provides something else than a shallow description
of the dynamic polarization phenomenon and a false model of the mechanism underpinning that
phenomenon; it gives us the first glimpse into the general design principles that govern the morphology
of the nervous system.
2. Cajal under the Mechanistic Lens
In some passages of their paper, Stinson and Sullivan [23] provide a concise analysis of the
discovery strategies and markers of progress of Cajal’s contributions to neuroscience, through the lens
of the new mechanistic philosophy. As already mentioned, a proper mechanistic explanation must
identify the explanandum phenomenon; typically, a target system and some behavior of that system.
Stinson and Sullivan focus in the search for the neural mechanisms of learning and memory. Thus,
the lives of Descartes, Pavlov, Cajal, Hebb, and Kandel are woven together into a single narrative of
discovery, to the extent that they contributed to the mechanistic explanation of learning and memory.
These scientists (including Cajal) were not aiming to discover “general laws” nor “large-scale scientific
theories” [23] (p. 381). They were trying to account for a local phenomenon—with local starting points
and termination conditions—by identifying the composing entities, activities, and organizational
features of the underlying mechanism.
From the mechanistic lens, Cajal’s work is praised as “a prime example of the decomposition
strategy at work” [23] (p. 382). These authors emphasize the explanatory power of Cajal’s early
1 Churchland [19] (p. 29) correctly emphasizes that Cajal’s mechanistic conjecture turned out to be wrong. Though some
instances of interneuronal communication can be accounted by “electrical synapses”, in which the connections are based on
direct electrical induction via gap junction channels (see [21]), the majority of interneuronal communications in the nervous
system involve “chemical synapses”, in which complex molecules act as messengers from one neuron to the next.
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anatomical findings, mainly obtained with Golgi’s silver staining technique, and artfully represented
in his drawings. His early work in the microanatomy of the nervous system of vertebrates helped to
convince most anatomists that the brain is made up of anatomically discrete cellular units, or neurons,
and showed how different kinds of neurons build different organized patterns in the nervous system.
Furthermore, Cajal also contributed to the discovery of many anatomical features of the parts of the
neuron, for example, dendritic spines, growth cones, and axon collaterals, among other entities.
However, from the same mechanistic lens, Cajal’s contributions to neurophysiology seems to be
relatively disappointing. Stinson and Sullivan [23] (p. 378) introduce the law of dynamic polarization
as the hypothesis that “conduction of impulses travel in one direction only, from dendrite to cell
body to axon.” Cajal’s histological methods “did not lend themselves well” to discovering how
nerve impulses are communicated between neurons [23] (p. 379). The discovery of the composing
entities and activities of the mechanism that mediates the connection between adjacent neurons were
“black boxes” for Cajal [23] (p. 382). Even worse, like many of his contemporaries, Cajal seemed
to believe (falsely) that neurofibrils contained in nerve cells take part in the mechanism of neuronal
impulse transmission, “harkening back to Descartes’s account” of the nerve impulse [23] (p. 379).
The silver staining technique could not reveal by itself the functional relevance of Cajal’s anatomical
findings. Physiological methods were required to discover the mechanisms that mediate neuronal
communication. The mechanistic explanation of the directionality of nerve impulses took off only
when the English physiologist Charles Scott Sherrington suggested that there was an intercellular
barrier, or synapse, that acted as a valve [17].
A similar attitude against Cajal’s physiological inductions is endorsed by Berlucchi [24], who
states that Cajal wrongly held that the law of dynamic polarization derives from the structural
differences between dendritic arborizations and axons because of not paying due attention to existing
neurophysiological studies. In particular, Cajal completely disregarded William James’ [25] proposal
of the law of forward direction, and Sherrington’s [26] experimental proof that axons in the CNS of
mammals can conduct impulses both away from and towards the parent cell body. According to
Berlucchi, Cajal’s attitude was detrimental to the progress of neuroscience. The history of modern
neuroscience reveals that no single experimental technique, however powerful, can by itself afford
the complete explanation of how the nervous system works. In this sense, the integration of multiple
scientific fields (or “multidisciplinarity,” in Berlucchi’s terms) is inevitably called for to develop a
satisfactory explanation of any phenomenon of interest in the neurosciences. Cajal’s scientific style is,
in this respect, an example not to follow.
It would be hard to overestimate the enduring contribution of Cajal’s anatomical findings, not only
to the mechanistic explanation of learning and memory but also to almost every research program
in the history of modern neuroscience. However, I am afraid that the discovery strategies and the
marks of progress of Cajal’s most treasured physiological hypothesis, the law of dynamic polarization,
are not evident from the mechanistic point of view. The mechanistic perspective reveals that Cajal’s
law either delivers a non-explanatory, phenomenological description of the dynamical polarization
phenomenon or provides only a how-possibly explanation, that is, a loosely constrained conjecture
about the mechanism that produces the dynamic polarization of the neuron [27]. The first is true
if the law merely describes the behavior of the target system, that is, the direction of the current in
many centers of the nervous system, without speculating about the mechanism for that phenomenon.
The second is true if Cajal provided an unconstrained conjecture about the relevant mechanism,
namely the transmission by contact between the terminal arborizations of a given neuron and the
protoplasmic expansions or the soma of adjacent neurons. In any case, the histological approach to the
nervous system preferred by Cajal could not enable him to intervene appropriately in the activities of
the nerve cell and its proper parts to reveal the productive continuity of the mechanism of impulse
transmission [9]. Thus, in due course, his approach was respectfully left behind.
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3. The History of the Law of Dynamic Polarization I: The Search for Generality
I contend that the output of Cajal’s lifetime investigations of the law of dynamic polarization
is something other than a few scratches on the surface of the phenomenon of the nerve impulse.
My argument can be summarized as follows: the mechanistic construal of Cajal’s law does not take into
account the evolution of Cajal’s thought on the subject. In particular, Stinson and Sullivan [23] (p. 378)
state Cajal’s law as follows: “conduction of impulses travel in one direction only, from dendrite to
cell body to axon.” This formulation corresponds to the original hypothesis supported by Cajal [5].
Let’s call it the “LDP-1891”. According to the LDP-1891, the dendritic expansions and the soma of
the nerve cell have cellulipetal conduction, while the axis-cylinder and its terminal arborizations have
cellulifugal conduction. However, Cajal was aware that the LDP-1891 faced several empirical anomalies.
Consequently, in ref [6], Cajal replaced it with a new law of axipetal polarization, according to which
the conduction in dendritic processes and the cell body is axipetal (i.e., towards the axon); whereas
the conduction in the axon is dendrifugal and somatofugal (i.e., it comes from the dendrites and the
cell body). Let’s call this new formulation the “LAP-1897”. In the following years, Cajal’s investigations
deepened further into the utilitarian significance of the axipetal polarization phenomenon. Finally,
in ref [28], Cajal arrived at a formulation of the law that clearly emphasized its role as a principle
of neural design. According to this definitive formulation, “impulses are exactly polarized in the
neuron, and take the minimum path between their point of entry and the origin of the conductor
that distributes them.” Let’s call it the “LAP-1899”. My claim is that the LAP-1899 is more than a
surface description of the dynamic polarization of the neuron. It also embodies an optimization
principle that governs the design of morphological configurations in the nervous system. As such,
the LAP-1899 represents a seminal contribution to the wiring optimization approach in modern
neuroscience [29]. To motivate this reinterpretation of Cajal’s physiological contributions, I need to
remove some significant epistemological obstacles.
The first obstacle is something of an elephant in the room. In many ways, Cajal was intensely
involved in the search for general, physiological laws and the development of large-scale physiological
theories in neurobiology. Of course, he was a “fervent adept of the religion of facts” and used to say
that “facts remain while theories pass away” [30] (p. 307). In particular, he claimed that first-hand,
anatomical facts remained fixed and stable while their physiological interpretation was subjected to
debate and speculation [30] (p. 309). Furthermore, he was well aware of the perils of generalization
by extrapolation of results, be it from one experimental technique to another, or from one animal
species to another, or from one nerve cell to another of the same kind but in a different developmental
stage. However, Cajal thought that the definitive formulation of the law of dynamic polarization
was “applicable to all cases without exception”: to vertebrates and invertebrates, to the adult and the
embryo. Indeed, “thanks to its complete generality, it constitutes a valuable key to the interpretation
of the courses of the currents in neurons of the nerve centers” [30] (p. 199). Today, we know that the
law of dynamic polarization is a mechanistically fragile generalization and that there are plenty of
exceptions to the dynamic polarization rule. In many neurons, nerve impulses can travel backward
from the axon and soma regions into the dendrites [31]. However, it is undeniable that Cajal was
seeking generality when he ventured into the physiology of the neuronal forest.
A second obstacle is the slightly anachronistic tendency to assess the importance of Cajal’s law
from the standpoint of Sherrington’s theory of the synapse. Considered as a general physiological
principle, Cajal’s law had a tremendous impact when it was first formulated [8]. The law defined the
dynamic schema in which any future investigation would have to be situated (it restricted “the space of
possible mechanisms,” in Craver’s terms). Since the law depended on the structural autonomy of the
neuron, it complemented the neuron doctrine by establishing the functional unity of the neuron. It had
a broad heuristic scope. It ruled out Golgi’s assumption of the trophic function of the dendrites. It was
coherent with the available knowledge about the embryogenesis and the evolution of the nervous
system. In a similar vein, my view is that the law of dynamic polarization, correctly formulated,
constituted a general principle of neural design, one that enabled Cajal to envision design explanations
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of the organization of neuronal elements in many regions of the nervous system. The explanatory role
of Cajal’s law that I emphasize here is not directly related, then, to the mechanistic progress in the
search for the underlying mechanism of the nerve impulse.
The third obstacle is to take for granted the content of the law of dynamic polarization.
The mechanistic interpretation has focused exclusively on the LDP-1891. However, as I mentioned
before, the law was “forged little by little, after many attempts and rectifications” [30] (p. 197).
The content of the LDP-1891 is partially different from the content of the LAP-1897. In the latter,
the cell body of the nerve cell has lost its centrality as an intermediate station of the nerve impulse.
Likewise, the definitive formulation of the LAP-1899 differs from the formulation of the LAP-1897,
in that the former accentuates the generality of the law as a principle of neural design. The explanatory
deficiency of the original formulation is uncontestable: the LDP-1891 is plainly false, as Cajal himself
admits. Thus it can hardly explain anything. Fictions might have some explaining role to play in the
sciences [32], but it is not necessary to take such a bold move to vindicate the explanatory power of
Cajal’s approach. In this paper I develop a different strategy.
In the ref [5] paper: “Significación fisiológica de las expansiones protoplasmáticas y nerviosas
de las células de la sustancia gris,” Cajal starts by praising Golgi’s discovery that the protoplasmic
expansions (or dendrites) of the nerve cells do not anastomose to each other but end freely within
the grey matter. Regarding the axis-cylinders or axons, despite Gerlach’s and Golgi’s doctrine that
axons fuse with one another forming a diffuse reticulum within the grey matter, Cajal contends that
direct observation never shows such a network of nerve fibers. He studied the texture of the nervous
systems of embryos, where one can follow the course of the nerve fibers to their termination points.
He observed that axis-cylinders and axon collaterals terminate in free arborizations around many
cells of the cerebellum, the spinal cord, the retina, the olfactory bulb, the optic lobe of birds, and so
on. After such a revolutionary change in anatomical ideas, scientists expected a similar change in the
physiological schema of nerve transmission through the nervous system. Some contact or induction
must realize the communication of action from one cell to another. So the questions Cajal is interested
in are the following: Which is the direction of the currents that run through the neuron? Do the currents
run from the axis-cylinder to the cell and the protoplasmic expansions, or do they move backward,
from the dendrites and through the axon to the terminal arborizations of the axon?
Cajal’s strategy to solve the problem is to imagine, in the first place, the direction of the current
on those nerve organs, such as the retina, the olfactory bulb, and the central motor pathways, in which
the starting point of the nerve impulse is well-known. Let us consider the olfactory mucosa and
the olfactory bulb (Figure 1). The nerve impulse begins from the protoplasmic expansions of the
bipolar cells (a) and goes through a very thin axon to the corresponding glomerulus (b). From there,
the excitation is received by the protoplasmic branches of the large pyramidal cells within the bulb (c),
which transmit the impulse through thick axons towards the olfactory bulb (d). It is evident that
dendritic arborizations always receive the nerve impulse and send it by nerve branches, all the way
into the brain.
One can observe the same functional polarization in centrifugal pathways, the main example being
the central motor pathway in the brain and the spinal cord (Figure 2). According to Cajal [6] (p. 6),
the “volitional act” (that is, the current that voluntary movement must produce) is transmitted to the
pyramidal cells of the psychomotor region of the cerebral cortex (A); from here it goes down along
the pyramidal tract (a) to the anterior horn of the spinal cord (b). The downward movement is then
picked up by the protoplasmic expansions of the motor neurons of the spinal cord and transferred to
the muscle fibers (C), where the terminal arborizations of the axons are located.
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Figure 1. A scheme of the cell junctions of the olfactory mucosa, the olfactory bulb, and the olfactory
lobe of the brain. The arrows represent the direction of the current. Taken from Cajal [5] (p. 4),
out of copyright.
Figure 2. A scheme of the central motor pathway in the brain and the spinal cord. Pyramidal neurons
in the motor area of the cerebral cortex (A) send signals directly to large neurons in the spinal cord (H)
called motor neurons. These motor neurons send command signals to our muscles (C). The arrows
represent the direction of the current. Taken from Cajal [6] (p. 6), out of copyright.
By analogical reasoning, Cajal [5] holds that the same functional polarization is observed in
central pathways of the nervous system, for example, in the cerebral cortex of lizards (Figure 3). It is
known that the pyramidal cells of the cerebral cortex send a protoplasmic stem to the molecular layer
of the grey matter, which ramifies into a plexus of thick, tiny branches. Many other nerve fibers, be it
from the same layer, or from cells from deeper layers, or even from sensitive tubes from the white
matter, also ramify in the same region. Thus, it is easy to conceive that the centrifuge movement
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starts in the dendrites of the pyramidal cells and goes next through their axonal expansions down the
pyramidal pathway.
Figure 3. A scheme of the nerve-protoplasmic connections of the cerebral cortex of reptiles. Taken from
Cajal [5] (p. 7), out of copyright.
Every cluster of nerve cells within the grey matter seems to confirm van Gehuchten’s [33]
conjecture (inspired by Cajal’s findings) about the direction of the nerve impulse. The general fact is
that dendrites drive the impulse somatopetally, towards the cell body, while the axis-cylinder drives
the impulse somatofugally, away from the cell body. This audacious conjecture, empirically supported
by Cajal’s anatomical discoveries, constitutes the content of the LDP-1891.
Cajal [5] acknowledges that there are several objections against the empirical generality of the
LDP-1891. The first anomaly is related to the centripetal conduction of the peripheral branch of
unipolar spinal cells (Figure 4D). Cajal finds it to be evident that the current in the peripheral branch
of the axonal expansion must run towards the cell body and, from there (or from the common stem),
towards the central fiber. The cellulipetal conduction of the axon violates the LDP-1891 since it implies
that the stem admits both a cellulifugal and a cellulipetal movement. Cajal deals with this anomaly in
a very peculiar way, by a rational interpretation of the ganglion cell morphology from the viewpoint of
its ontogenetic and phylogenetic evolution. The peripheral expansion of monopolar sensitive cells in
adult vertebrates has the anatomical features of an axon. But, if we descend through the animal series
and consider the sensitive cell in lower animals, like worms or mollusks, or if we analyze the neuron
in its embryonic state, it exhibits a bipolar morphology, with an external expansion that has, according
to Cajal, the distinctive features of a dendrite.
The second anomaly is mentioned by Cajal in his argument against Golgi’s physiological doctrine
of the purely vegetative function of dendritic arborizations. He comments that, in some crook-shaped
cells of the optic lobe of lower vertebrates, the axon is born not from the cell body but from a
protoplasmic branch, and far away from the origin of that branch in the cell body (Figure 5c). Such a
disposition implies that there is cellulifugal conduction in the dendritic stem from its origin in the cell
body to the point at which the axon sprouts, thus violating the LDP-1891. Cajal does not provide the
solution for this anomaly in the ref [5] (1891) paper.
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Figure 4. A scheme that shows the changes in placement and morphology of sensitive ganglion
cells in the animal series. (A) Sensitive cells of the earthworm; (B) sensitive cells from mollusks;
(C) sensitive cells from fish; (D) sensitive cells from mammals, birds, reptiles, and frogs. Taken from
Cajal [30] (p. 194); out of copyright.
Figure 5. A crook-shaped cell of the optic lobe of birds. Taken from Cajal [6] (p. 3); out of copyright.
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The definitive formulation of the LDP-1891 is as follows: the transmission of nerve movement
runs from the protoplasmic branches and the cell body towards the nerve expansion. In functional
terms, every nerve cell has a reception device (cell body and protoplasmic arborizations), a conduction
device (the axis-cylinder), and an application device (the terminal arborizations of the axis-cylinder).
The intended scope of this functional law includes every nerve cell of every gray matter center in the
nervous system.
4. The History of the Law of Dynamic Polarization II: Cajal’s Glimpse into Neural Design
From the very beginning of the ref [6] (1897) paper: “Leyes de la morfología y dinamismo de las
células nerviosas,” Cajal admits that the ref [5] formula of the LDP-1891 is not correct. It applies only
to sensitive bipolar cells, and to all other neurons whose dendritic expansions sprout from the cell
body. The generalization is false whenever the soma of the neuron is dislocated and placed away from
the axis-cylinder, as in ganglion cells, or whenever the axon sprouts from a protoplasmic branch, as in
the crook-shaped cells of the optic lobe. Encouragingly, Cajal provides a rectification of the law, which
applies without exceptions across the animal series. The law of axipetal polarization, or LAP-1897,
states that the conduction in dendritic processes and the cell body is axipetal (i.e., towards the axon);
whereas the conduction in the axon is dendrifugal and somatofugal (i.e., it comes from the dendrites
and the cell body). Note that, according to the LAP-1897, impulses collected by dendritic expansions
do not need to pass always through the cell body of the neuron, but can go directly to the axon, where
they follow their march towards adjacent neurons. While the LDP-1891 hypothesized a cellulipetal
direction of the current in the dendrites and an axipetal course in the soma, the LAP-1897 assigns
the same functionality both to the dendrites and the cell body. In this way, the dendritic expansions
and the cell body represent a system of convergent currents, the axis-cylinder represents a channel of
parallel currents, and the terminal arborizations of the nerve constitute a bundle of divergent currents.
The new formulation appears to be entirely general, that is, applicable to all cases without exception.
Crucially, it solves the anomalies of the LDP-1891.
Consider the fusiform, crook-shaped neuron of the optic lobe of birds (Figure 5) again. The nerve
expansion sprouts from the upper end of a protoplasmic branch, to descend next to the deep layer
of nerve fibers. If we assume that the dendrites transmit the impulse only centripetally, then the
cellulifugal current of the dendritic stem (from the cell body to the axon) would violate the LDP-1891.
However, if we assume the LAP-1897, the puzzling character of the morphology of the neuron
disappears, and its structure fits the general dynamical plan. The nerve impulse does not need to go
across the cell body. Indeed, the placement of the soma may vary from neuron to neuron, following
two different determinants: the need to connect specific neurons, on the one side, and the need to save
space in the system, by settling the nucleus in the place where there are fewer terminal arborizations.
Regarding the ganglion cells of vertebrates (Figure 4D), the LDP-1891 required us to suppose that
the main stem admits both a cellulipetal movement from the peripheral expansion and a cellulifugal
current from the cell body towards the central axonal expansion. We can avoid this puzzling result
if we consider the arrangement as an instance of the LAP-1897. The sensitive excitation received by
the peripheral expansion (D) would go directly to the medulla (M), without going through the cell
body, and the conduction of the soma and the main stem would be equally axipetal. Cajal provides
a rational interpretation of the morphology of the cell again, suggesting that the cell body seems to
have moved away from the bifurcation fiber to satisfy the need to save conduction time and material.
To motivate this rational interpretation, he recalls the paradoxical phenomenon exhibited by ganglion
cells (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. A scheme of the structure of spinal ganglia. (A): spinal ganglion of a fish (stingray); (B): spinal
ganglion of a mammal (cat). Taken from Cajal [6] (p. 11); out of copyright.
In both ontogenetic and phylogenetic evolution, sensitive ganglion cells shifted from a bipolar
shape to a monopolar configuration, that is, from a relatively complex morphology to a relatively
simple form. The comparison between the schemes in Figure 6 reveals the differences in wiring length
and, thus, the differences in conduction time, between the ganglion cells of fish and those of higher
vertebrates. The bipolar form of the neurons in scheme 6A requires the nerve expansions and the
peripheral expansions of the cells to follow a winding path across the cell bodies, lengthening the
itinerary of the excitation. In Figure 6B, of a mammal, cell bodies have taken shelter in the periphery,
moving away from the central region of the ganglion, where the sensitive conduits are arranged
in rectilinear bundles. Such an arrangement is, to Cajal’s eyes, the most complete and ingenious
application of the law of economy of conduction time. In an exercise of Darwinian morphology, Cajal
argues that such a disposition is advantageous for the animal, given the patent benefit that high speed
in the conduction of tactile and painful impressions must have brought in higher vertebrates in their
struggle for existence.
Cajal [6] highlights that a good indicator of the correctness of a theory is that it contributes to the
discovery of new (even more fundamental) principles of explanation applicable to new phenomena.
That seems to be the case with the law of dynamic polarization, once we purged it from the mistaken
idea that the cell body must necessarily participate in the conduction of incoming currents from the
dendritic arborizations. Revealingly, Cajal [28] asks himself why he could not come up with the
LAP-1897 from the start. Why did he maintain the cellulipetal theory for so long? Why did he consider
the cell body to be the indispensable center for neuronal conduction? Surprisingly, the answer is that
the main epistemological obstacle in the way to the LAP-1897 was the cell theory; in particular, the idea
that the cell body is the cell itself, that is, the entire cell, despite the discovery of the omnipresence
of enormous dendrites in grey matter. Van Gehuchten noted that, by removing the soma from an
obligatory role in nerve conduction, “Cajal abandoned what one refers to as the physiological unity of
the neuron” (quoted by [2] (p. 14)).
The LAP-1897 accounts for the anatomical positioning of the dendrites and the terminal
arborizations of the axon; everything else about the anatomy of the nerve cells, including the
positioning of the soma, appears to be variable and accommodative. Cajal [28] (p. 102) raises the
following question: “Are these variations merely whims of Nature, arrangements without importance,
or have they some physiologic significance?” He answers that every empirical evidence suggests that
the anatomical variations in question are of actual use to the dynamics of the system that exhibits
them, that is, that they respond to some physiologic design, and are thus the output of evolutionary
(maybe Darwinian) mechanisms. The observed displacements are, thus, “morphologic adaptations
ruled by laws of economy of time, space and matter” [28] (p. 102).
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The laws of economy of time, space, and matter represent Cajal’s ultimate “inductive effort”
to glimpse into the “utilitarian principles” that seems to govern the infinite varieties of form, size,
position, and direction of neurons and nerve fibers [30] (p. 314). As utilitarian principles, these laws
might provide a design explanation of all those seemingly capricious variants of the point of emergence
of the axon (crook-shaped cells), as well as a design explanation of the dislocation or migration of the
cell body during evolution and development (sensitive ganglion cells). They also explain phenomena
like the concentration of sensitive and motor neurons in ganglia, the bifurcations in the form of a Y
(instead of a T) of the nerve fibers upon their arrival at the posterior cord, and the point of origin of the
axon in the dendritic arborizations of the cerebellum grains [6].
In the final evolution of his thought, Cajal [28] adds that the laws of economy not only represent
constraints in the design of the microanatomy of the nervous system but also are intermingled with the
phenomenon of axipetal polarization itself. From a teleological point of view, these principles postulate
the construction of the shortest path among connected neuronal territories, with the corresponding
time saving as a dynamical consequence, as well as the avoidance of useless holes in grey matter.
Cajal characterizes the polarization of the neuron as the general fact that, under normal conditions,
“only impulses of the same direction can travel through its appendages” [28] (p. 116). It becomes
evident that, by ruling out impulses of opposite direction travelling through the same appendages,
nature wanted to avoid all the interference of impulses with each other. Cell polarization is a constant
phenomenon in the nervous system of living, healthy organisms because it represents the answer to
the need to avoid transmission interference in organisms that exhibit a differentiation of a surface of
reception (skin and senses) and a surface of emission (muscles and glands).
Cajal [28] (p. 88) synthesizes the content of the law of axipetal polarization in a way that
emphasizes the tradeoffs between different design principles and the teleological aspects of the
cell polarization phenomenon. Specifically, he states the law of axipetal polarization as an optimization
principle. An optimization principle is a general constraint on the space of possible solutions to an
optimization problem. An optimization problem requires designing a structure able to carry out a given
task within a given operating context, with a minimum cost. According to Cajal [28], the optimization
problem imposed on the organism seems to be the following: to build, with the minimal amount of
matter, within the minimum containing space, the most richly differentiated nervous machinery of
the most rapid, robust, and efficient reactions. Thus, the definitive formulation of the law of axipetal
polarization is as follows [28] (p. 88):
The LAP-1899: “Impulses are exactly polarized in the neuron, and take the minimum path
between their point of entry and the origin of the conductor that distributes them.”
In the living, healthy animal, Cajal asserts, impulses are collected either for dendrites or the cell body;
then, they are conducted through these protoplasmic portions by the shortest path to the axon, which
distributes them using its multiple arborizations. There is no need to pass through the cell body if it is
not in the most direct route from the dendrites to the axon.
5. The Structure of Design Explanation
To fully understand the explanatory import of the LAP-1899 one needs to answer some of the
following questions: How do design principles explain in neuroscience? What are the norms of design
explanation? And, especially: How do optimization principles explain? A rigorous and complete
answer to these questions would require another paper. In the meantime, I hold that Wouters’s [34,35]
philosophical analysis of design explanation in functional biology gets us on the right track.
Design explanations are usually brought up in answer to explanatory demands in functional
biology, that is, that part of biology that is concerned with the way individual organisms are
built (e.g., anatomy, morphology), the way they work (e.g., physiology), and the way they behave
(e.g., ethology). The basic idea is that design explanations purport to explain why specific organisms
have certain traits “by showing that their actual design is better than contrasting designs” [35].
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The hallmark of design explanations is their concern with the utility of a particular trait, often in
comparison with merely possible alternatives.
Concerning the explanandum of a design explanation, Wouters [34] claims that design
explanations are answers to questions of the following form: (Q) “Why do s-organisms have t1
rather than t2, t3, . . . , tn?”, where s is a set of organisms (that might be taxonomically heterogeneous),
t1 is the trait in question (i.e., the presence or character of a specific item or behavior) of s-organisms,
and t2, t3, . . . , tn are the alternative traits. Design explanations are explicitly or implicitly contrastive:
they compare real organisms to hypothetical organisms that may not exist. Questions like (Q) are
not questions that ask about causes at the level of individual organisms. Neither are they questions
that ask about evolutionary causes at the level of the population. The hypothetical alternatives to the
actual trait may have never existed. Questions like (Q) ask about the utility of a character regarding
what is needed or useful to stay alive, that is, to maintain the organism, to grow, to develop, and to
produce offspring.
Regarding the explanans of a design explanation, the core of an answer to a (Q)-question has
the following structure: (C) s-organisms live in condition c; and (U) In condition c the trait t1 is more
useful than traits t2, t3, . . . , tn, where c is a conjunction of one or more conditions of organisms and/or
environments in which organisms live. Statements like (C) specify conditions that apply to the relevant
organisms, and statements like (U) claim that, due to those conditions, the trait in question is more
useful to the s-organisms than the alternative traits [34].
Claims about utilities may vary in strength. Simple design explanations can be classified either as
optimization or as requirement explanations, depending on whether the utility claim is an optimization
claim or a requirement claim [34]. A requirement claim has the following form: “In condition c, trait t1
is the only useful one among the following traits: t1, t2, t3, . . . , tn.” Requirement claims assert that the
trait in question is the only one in the reference class that works. Many design explanations derive
requirements directly from the laws of physics and chemistry. In contrast, an optimization claim is
relatively weaker and has the following form: “In condition c, trait t1 is more useful than each of the
following traits: t2, t3, . . . , tn”. Optimization claims assert that the trait in question is the best one in
the reference class. Optimization explanations explain why the optimization claim holds, that is, they
indicate the disadvantages that the organisms in question would have in the conditions in which they
live if an alternative replaced the trait in question.
The train of thought of design explanation is present in Cajal’s physiological reasoning. Why do
sensitive ganglion cells in adult mammals exhibit a monopolar morphology (rather than a bipolar or
multipolar morphology)? Because there is, in normal conditions, a need to save material, space and time
conduction, and moving the cell bodies to the periphery of the ganglion while arranging the sensitive
conduits in rectilinear bundles in the central region represents the most advantageous disposition to
satisfy that need. Why don’t the nerve impulses pass through the cell body in the sensitive ganglion
cells of mammals? Because there is, in normal conditions, a need to save time conduction, and the
direct path from the terminal arborizations to the medulla is the minimum path between the point
of entry of the impulse and the origin of the conductor that distributes it. Why do sensitive and
motor neurons concentrate in ganglia in invertebrates, as Spencer noticed in 1896? Because there is
a need to economize protoplasm and space, and the successive concentration of initially separated
neurons economizes conductors and allows one fiber to communicate the excitation to a high number
of neurons. Why do the nerve fibers bifurcate in the form of a Y (instead of a T) upon their arrival
at the posterior cord? Because there is, in normal conditions, a need to save conduction time, and
the Y-shaped bifurcation represents the shortest path between the entry point and the exit point of
the excitation.
Note that design explanation is not a kind of mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanations
aim to account for how a specific capacity of a target system is brought about by identifying
the composing entities, activities, and organization of the underlying mechanism. In contrast, design
explanations aim to account for why parts exhibit specific morphological features, why biological roles
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are performed the way they are, and why the anatomical elements are organized as they are rather
than in some other conceivable way.
6. Concluding Remarks
Cajal did not regard the LAP-1899 as the schematic description of the mechanism that
underlies neuronal communication, nor as a phenomenological model of the dynamical polarization
phenomenon itself, but as a thread in a web of mutually constraining principles of neural design.
Modern neuroscientists know that the wiring cost of connections in the brain has multiple origins:
it arises from volume, metabolic requirements, signal delay and attenuation, and guidance defects
in development, among other factors [29,36]. Since long-range connections in the brain are a limited
resource, it is expectable that, other things being equal, nature would prefer the layout with minimum
wiring cost. From this point of view, we can interpret the different organizations of neural components
within the brain as solutions to specific wiring minimization problems constrained by a given neuronal
connectivity. This principle of neural design is known as the wiring optimization principle [37].
In general, the wiring optimization principle states that, given a fixed connectivity pattern between
neural components within the brain, the wiring cost determines neuronal architecture.
Neuroscientists have used the wiring optimization principle to generate a whole family of
optimization models that account for many features of brain organization, to wit: why there are
separate visual cortical areas [38,39], why the neocortex folds in a characteristic species-specific pattern,
why neurons in the mammalian visual cortex are organized into multiple maps [36], why ocular
dominance patterns exist, why we found orientation preference patterns in the visual cortex, why
axonal and dendritic arbors have particular branching angles [40], and why axons and dendrites occupy
a 3/5 fraction of gray matter [41], among many other phenomena. Some modern neuroscientists have
argued that the reduction of path lengths appears to be at least as necessary as the minimization
of wire length. Long distance connections are metabolically expensive, but they have the benefit of
reducing the number of intermediate transmission steps in neural pathways [37]. The benefits of
processing efficiency obtained by adding long-distance projections might outweigh the wiring costs of
establishing those additional connections.
In any case, Cajal’s foundational inquiries into the phenomenon of dynamic polarization and the
laws of economy of space, time, and matter constitute the starting point of a scientific tradition aimed
at discovering what the principles of neural design are, and how they relate to each other, to explain
the anatomy and morphology of the nervous system at different levels of organization.
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